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ESSAYS
Trade Secrets: How Well Should We Be
Allowed To Hide Them? The Economic
Espionage Act of 1996
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss*
The secret that I hide...
How will they hear?
When will they learn?
How will they know?**
INTRODUCTION
Something seems to have gone awry in the intellectual property
bargain. Here is my understanding of how this bargain is supposed
to work: a creator discloses new information in exchange for
which the state grants him protection against free riders for a lim-
ited period of time. For the creator, the bargain is advantageous
because it allows him to capture a reward sufficiently large to re-
coup the costs of inventing and earn a substantial profit. From the
point of view of the state, the potential for profit creates incentives
to innovate. More important, the innovations that this system en-
courages become contributions to the storehouse of knowledge.
To make the bargain meaningful, however, that contribution has to
* Professor of Law and Director of the Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and
Policy, New York University Law School. I wish to thank Harry First for his close
reading and illuminating comments on an earlier draft. A version of this Essay was pre-
sented on April 17, 1998, at the Sixth Annual Conference on International Intellectual
Property Law and Policy at Fordham University School of Law.
** MADONNA, Live to Tell, on TRUE BLUE (Sire Records 1986).
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
be "real"-real in the sense that the must not already be a part of
the knowledge base. Also real in that the contribution has to be
genuinely placed into the knowledge base, that is, disclosed in a
manner that allows others to learn from it during the term of exclu-
sivity, and utilize it without restriction when the term of exclusiv-
ity expires.
To be sure, not all intellectual property law makes this bargain
quite as explicitly as I have done. In trademark law, for example,
the "innovation" is mainly goodwill, which not everyone would
consider a contribution to the storehouse of knowledge. Nor is it
always the case that the bargain is examined every time a claim for
protection is made. 'Thus, there are copyrights that protect works
that are not very innovative, and trade secrets are generally en-
forceable without direct scrutiny of their degree of novelty. Fur-
ther, the public's interest in free access is not always directly safe-
guarded. For example, neither trademarks nor trade secrets are
subject to a specific term of years.' Nonetheless, in all the tradi-
tional intellectual property regimes, the basic contours of the bar-
gain are always in place: fair use creates a way for the public to
utilize trademarks even while they are protected; the subject matter
restrictions of the Copyright Act,2 coupled with its definition of in-
fringement, keep non-novel material in the public domain; the
definition of a trade secret eliminates from the ambit of protection
information that is already generally known. And although in
some cases, there is no specific time when the rights expire, so far,
they have all always eventually ended. For patents and copyrights,
the rights end at the expiration of the statutory term, for trade-
marks, the rights end through abandonment, and for trade secrets,
through reverse engineering, independent discovery, or inadvertent
disclosure (in today's terms, "leaks").
Now, what has gone wrong? Recent changes (or proposed
changes) in the law are making it possible to acquire exclusive
rights in information that is not new, and to acquire rights in new
information without meaningfully placing that information in the
storehouse of knowledge. For example, I have written about ex-
1. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1059 (West Supp. 1999).
2. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999).
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panding trademark rights and rights of publicity.3 I will not revisit
that analysis here, except to repeat that as interpreted, these provi-
sions create nearly perpetual protection for symbolic representa-
tions that are not necessarily novel, that have significant expressive
impact, and that do not appear to go into the storehouse of knowl-
edge in any real sense.4 A recent amendment to the Lanham Act5
protecting famous marks against dilution-a concept much more
nebulous than consumer confusion-exacerbates this problem. 6 A
new bill to register and protect trade dress goes even further, for it
covers a large range of materials, both packaging and product con-
figurations, without the need to demonstrate any informational
content whatsoever.7 Similar changes have occurred, or are pro-
posed, in the copyright industries. Thus, questions have long been
directed at the way that copyrights in computer programs are
treated, for the Copyright Office's willingness to register programs
without full disclosure has led to a situation where access to un-
protectable ideas is denied.8 The same may soon hold true for
3. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should
We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20
CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & THE ARTS 123 (1996) (analyzing how images are perceived and in-
terpreted and how to decide when a proprietor's interest in capturing the value in what
has been created ends and the public's interest in using that creation symbolically begins)
[hereinafter Dreyfuss, We are Symbols]; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Generic-
ity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397
(1990) (criticizing recent case law for paying insufficient attention to the expressive di-
mension of trademarks to their powerful role in the vocabulary as metaphors and sym-
bols) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity].
4. See id.
5. Trademark Act of 1946 ("Lanham Act"), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998)).
6. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109
Stat. 985 (effective Jan. 16, 1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp.
1998)).
7. H.R. 3163, 105th Cong. (1998). As proposed, the bill requires that trade dress be
inherently distinctive, but does not require a showing that customers associate the trade
dress with any particular message. Admittedly, this definition conforms to current case
law, see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), but without this leg-
islation, there was some hope that the lower courts would understand Two Pesos to have
been overruled sub silentio, see Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159
(1995), which requires a showing of secondary meaning in connection with the protection
of color.
8. See Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.20(c)(2), 202.21
(1997); David A. Rice, Sega And Beyond: A Beacon For Fair Use Analysis... At Least
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factual material. Unless carefully drafted, meeting the demand for
database protection is likely to withdraw significant amounts of
raw material from the storehouse of knowledge.9
Despite all of these problems in trademark and copyright law,
it is probably fair to say that nothing is as likely to affect the crea-
tive environment as much as two recent developments in trade se-
crecy law. At the state level, there is a proposal to amend Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") to cover intellectual
property licensing,' ° and at the federal level, there is the 1996 en-
actment of the Economic Espionage Act (the "EEA")." These de-
velopments have much in common. Both drastically change the
bargain between the public and the rights holder. By moving the
core divide between what is secret and what is not, they allow for
the protection of material that is not new. And by making trade se-
crets less susceptible to exposure, they both substantially eliminate
the possibility that the right holder's contribution, such as it is, will
ever go into the domain of the public.
Significantly, neither proposed Article 2B nor the EEA was
primarily the work product of the intellectual property community.
Commercial lawyers, like those who wrote Article 2 on the sale of
goods, largely drafted Article 2B. Their interest was initially to
create a mechanism for contracting in cyberspace. Toward the end
of the project, the decision was made to expand Article 2 to cover
the licensing of intangibles more generally; thus, it was rather late
As Far As It Goes., 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1131, 1151 (1994); S. Carran Daughtrey, Re-
verse Engineering of Software for Interoperability and Analysis, 47 VAND. L. REV. 145,
153-55 (1994).
9. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of
Works of information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1916 (1990). See generally, Jessica
Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (1992) (ar-
guing for a reversal in the current course of copyright expansion); J.H. Reichman, Elec-
tronic Information Tools-The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 17 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 797 (1992) (suggesting that the tension that arise when information is
viewed wither as a "literary work" or as a "tool" confirm the need for a new intellectual
property model that is not premised on the classical distinctions between "art" and "in-
ventions").
10. See U.C.C. § 2B (Tentative Draft Apr. 15, 1998) (visited Dec. 4, 1998)
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2/2b498.htm>.
II. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831-39 (West 1998)).
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in the day that intellectual property lawyers, their bar associations,
and their clients became heavily involved." By the same token,
the EEA is best viewed as an outgrowth of concern over what na-
tions will do with the spies and spying equipment left over from
the Cold War. In the Senate, the legislation was considered by the
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Judiciary Subcommittee
on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information; in the
House, the Subcommittee on Crime of the Judiciary Committee
had primary responsibility for the legislation. Although hearings
were held, the witnesses were not members of the intellectual
property bar, but rather people like Louis J. Freeh, Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation." In the case of both measures,
the drafters focused on protecting the value of existing works,
rather than supporting an environment in which creativity and in-
novation would continue to take place. Indeed, the drafters of
these provisions seem to have entirely missed the dynamic quality
of invention-the fact that knowledge builds upon itself; that ex-
isting works are not only output that can be exploited, but also the
input on which innovators of the future depend.
In a companion piece, I analyze proposed Article 2B of the
U.C.C. 14 More specifically, I demonstrate in some detail how Arti-
cle 2B's policy of transactional autonomy will alter the structure of
intellectual property protection. I argue that some of these effects
are likely to run afoul of national innovation policy and are prob-
lematic from a normative perspective. This Essay analyzes the
EEA. Part I describes the Act, its legislative foundation, and re-
views the five key features of the statute. Part II explores the Act's
likely impact on innovation. This Essay concludes that if the EEA
12. See U.C.C. § 2B, supra note 10, at Preface; David A. Rice, Digital Information
as Property and Product: U.C.C. Article 2B, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 621 (1997).
13. See S. REP. No. 104-359, at 5 (1996); H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 14-16 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4032-4033. See also Gerald J. Mossinghoff et al.,
The Economic Espionage Act: A New Federal Regime of Trade Secret Protection, 79 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 191, 192 (1997) (examining the legislative history and
criminal law aspects of the Economic Espionage Act and outlining steps to avoid prob-
lems with this legislation law).
14. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Do You Want to Know a Trade Secret? How
Article 2B Will Make Licensing Trade Secrets Easier (But Innovation More Difficult), 87
CAL. L. REV. 191 (1999) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Do You Want to Know a Trade Secret?].
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is interpreted broadly, it will to stifle innovation by reducing the
flow of public domain information.
I. THE EEA
It will probably take some time before the precise contours of
the EEA are well understood. Not only are its legislative origins
atypical, but its intent is, in some ways, obscure. The legislative
history is clear enough. Congress was concerned that there was in-
sufficient protection against the unauthorized appropriation of in-
tellectual products. At the federal level, copyright and patent laws
protect only a small part of the "proprietary information" that is
valuable to American industry. The rest is secret information." To
be sure, there are relevant criminal statutes-most obviously, the
Interstate (National) Transportation of Stolen Property Act 6 and
the statutes that criminalize mail fraud 7 and wire fraud.' How-
ever, Congress believed these enactments to be of limited value.
The former requires a "physical taking of the subject goods;"' 9 the
latter cannot reach appropriations that do not involve the use of the
mail or wires.20 At the state level, protection for trade secrets also
15. See S. REP. 104-359, at 17 (1996) ("proprietary information, in contrast with
copyrighted material and patented inventions, is secret. The value of the information is
almost entirely dependent on its being a closely held secret.").
16. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2314 (WestSupp. 1999).
17. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 1999).
18. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West Supp. 1999).
19. See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985); United States v.
Brown, 925 F.2d1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 1991).
20. One can question Congress' judgment. Courts have been very lenient when de-
termining the role that the use of mail or wire must play in the fraud alleged in the in-
dictment. However, these statutes may have other limitations. Past mail and wire fraud
cases involving secret information have all concerned breaches of fiduciary duty. See,
e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987) (holding that the conspiracy to
trade on employer's confidential information is within the reach of the mail and wire
fraud statutes). Not all misappropriations involve breaching such obligations. In addi-
tion, the enactment of special legislation sends a message to prosecutors that this is an
area where Congress wants resources placed.
There are a few other federal criminal statutes that can be used to protect proprietary
information, but they too have significant limitations. For example, the Trade Secrets
Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1905 (West 1998), penalizes only governmental employees who dis-
close information in government control. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO), Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Sta. 941 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C.A. §§
1961-1968 (West 1998)), only enhances the punishment imposed for acts unlawful under
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exists, but Congress did not consider these regimes to be adequate
either. It found that companies often fail to avail themselves of
their civil remedies due to the cost of pursuing legal action and the
possibility that the defendant will be found judgment proof. Fur-
ther, Congress noted that "[e]ven if a company does bring suit, the
civil penalties often are absorbed by the offender as a cost of doing
business and the stolen information retained for continued use.",
21
Congress also spoke of a need for legislation that is comprehen-
sive, meaning protection that transcends, State and national bor-
ders. 2
The question, however, is how Congress accomplished its
goals. It could have created an analogue to patent and copyright
law, but these laws do not have an extraterritorial reach.23
Moreover, they share with state civil law the problems of the re-
source-deficient plaintiff and the judgment-indifferent defendant.
Further, any such legislation might run afoul of the Supreme
Court's decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.,24 which read the Copyright and Patent Clause of the
Constitution2 ' as disabling Congress from recognizing rights in the
subcopyrightable and subpatentable materials that constitute the
bulk of "proprietary information. 2 6
One alternative available to Congress was to use its Commerce
Clause authority to criminalize violations of state civil law: that is,
to create criminal liability for committing the tort of misappropria-
tion as defined by state law. Perhaps that is what the EEA was in-
tended to do, but that conclusion is by no means clear. On the one
hand, the EEA appears to track the subject matter definitions of
state law, and to prohibit "unauthorized appropriation"-a term not
other legislation. For a general discussion of federal criminal intellectual property law,
see Sivan Baron et al., Intellectual Properly, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 741 (1997).
21. S. REP. No. 104-359, at 29 (1996).
22. See id. at 4 (speaking of information "in interstate and foreign commerce").
23. For a suggestion to this effect, see Christopher Rebel J Pace, The Case for a
Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427 (1995), which includes a detailed
state-by-state analysis of state laws.
24. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347-
48(1991).
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too different from the familiar "misappropriation" of state law. At
the same time, however, the statute departs from state trade secrecy
law in several important respects. Its definition of unauthorized
appropriation is different from that found in the states. The statute
also includes state-of-mind elements, including the intent to benefit
another entity and to deprive the "owner" of the secret's value,
which are unknown to state causes of action-as, indeed, is the
concept of owner, as opposed to rights holder.27 Finally, the statute
creates rights against interceptions that occur outside the United
States, which state laws could probably never reach, and-given
its criminal nature-also departs from state legislation by substi-
tuting punishment for remedial action 28
The result is something of a mongrel. The EEA's many novel
provisions will provide courts with difficult questions to resolve,
but since the Act is not based on federal intellectual property law,
federal criminal law, or state intellectual property law, it is difficult
to predict what case law and traditions courts will draw upon in re-
solving them. This Part describes the five key features of the stat-
ute: subject matter, unauthorized appropriation, state of mind, ex-
traterritoriality, and punishment. It points out some of the
questions that EEA prosecutions are likely to raise, but it can do no
more than suggest what courts should consider when interpreting
the statute.
27. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1832 (West 1998). The term "owner" is defined in section
1839(4) of the EEA, as "the person or entity in whom or in which rightful legal or equita-
ble title to, or license in, the trade secret is reposed." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(4) (West 1998).
The difference between the criminal and civil emphasis may be attributable to the fact
that there is more concern in civil litigation about the number of potential lawsuits arising
from a single breach of a license. Accordingly, standing in the licensing situation is care-
fully circumscribed. Since only the government can bring a criminal prosecution, the
definition of the victim can be more expansive here. Including the licensor as owner
may, however, raise other questions. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
28. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1837 (West 1998).
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A. Subject Matter
Despite the legislative talk of "proprietary information," the
EEA as codified is framed in terms of "trade secrets." These are
defined as follows:
[A]I1 forms and types of financial, business, scientific,
technical, economic, or engineering information, including
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas,
designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, proce-
dures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible,
and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or
in writing if-
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to
keep such information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable through
proper means by, the public.. .29
The thrust of this definition appears to be very similar to the
analogous sections in the two principal sources of state trade se-
crecy law, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"), ° which is the
basis of state trade secrecy statutes and the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition ("Restatement"),3 which summarizes state
common law of trade secrecy. All three protect information that
requires an investment to create and that is valuable by reason of
the fact that it is not publicly known. The holder of the right-or
the owner under the EEA-must take reasonable measures to keep
the information secret.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (West 1998).
30. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A 433 (1985). The UTSA has been adopted
by some 40 states; courts in other states usually rely on the American Law Institute's
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 38-45 (1995). Some states continue
to cite American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 757 and ff. (1939).
See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES
123 (4th ed. 1997).
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
1998]
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The first part of the provision, the types of information that
qualify for protection, is not likely to raise many questions. The
EEA's list is much longer than the comparable sections of the
UTSA and the Restatement,32 which should lead courts to interpret
the provision broadly-to include such "information" as marketing
strategy and customer lists, which have sometimes raised questions
in state cases. The two provisos, that the information be secret and
reasonable measures be employed to keep it secret, are much more
likely to prove problematic, for neither the statute nor its legisla-
tive history define what is considered secret or explains what
measures owners must reasonably take quickly for this protection.33
One way that courts could handle the problem would be by de-
ferring to state law, taking the position that the EEA was basically
meant as a criminal adjunct to state regimes and should be inter-
preted as such. The structural commonality between this provision
and state laws lends support to the above proposition. Moreover,
adopting it would have the advantage of allowing federal courts
entertaining EEA cases to rely on the elaboration of these terms in
the case law of the state in which the violation took place. For ex-
ample, if information was appropriated in Utah, then the court
would look to Utah decisions determining what is considered se-
cret and what actions were reasonable.
A number of problems can, however, be anticipated with this
approach. First, cases that cross state lines would raise choice of
law issues. For example, if the information taken in Utah were
used in California, would Utah or California trade secrecy law ap-
ply?34 Even more difficult would be the choice of law questions
32. Compare supra note 30 and accompanying text, with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (providing that the information be "sufficiently valu-
able and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others"; no spe-
cific examples of subject matter are provided, except in commentary), and UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT, § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433, 438 (1985) (using language similar to subsections
(A) and (B), and providing as examples "a formula, pattern, compilation, program, de-
vice, method, technique, or process").
33. See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 7 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021,
4026 ("While it will be up to the court in each case to determine whether the owners ef-
forts to protect the information in question were reasonable under the circumstances, it is
not the Committee's intent that the owner be required to have taken every conceivable
step to protect the property from misappropriation.").
34. See, e.g., Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., 139
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arising from foreign activities. Second, the statute was, as noted
above, meant to be comprehensive. That goal might be regarded
as precluding outcomes that depend on the vagaries of particular
state legal regimes. Third, the many other provisions of the Act
that differ from state law demonstrate that the statute was meant to
do more than merely criminalize state torts.
The other approach would be to interpret these provisions from
first principles. One way to think of the secrecy requirement in
trade secrets law is as a substitute for the quality dimension of
other laws-the novelty and nonobvious requirements of patent
law,35 and the authorship and originality requirements of copyright
law.36 Under this view, the real issue regarding subject matter is
whether the information is new-new to the world or new to the in-
dustry that is using it.37 Secrecy is a proxy for that determination
because information that is known is perforce not secret. The same
could be said about reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy. Here,
the notion is that the owner's actions regarding the information is
probative of its novelty. The owner can be assumed to know his
own field. Unless the information were novel, meaning it had
value by reason of being secret, he would not bother to protect it.
To the extent this is true, courts facing difficult questions about
whether information qualifies as a secret or was subject to reason-
able efforts to maintain secrecy could supplement their considera-
tion of the defendant's activities with a, look at the novelty of the
information at issue.
Three other considerations can also be brought to bear on the
question of interpreting which actions an owner must reasonably
take to qualify for protection. One is that the reasonableness re-
quirement can operate as a replacement for requiring the trade se-
crecy holder to give notice of the intent to assert proprietary rights.
Prior to joining the Berne Convention, virtually all American in-
tellectual property laws required notice.38 The justification was
F.3d 1396, 1410 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (applying Massachusetts law on unfair trade claim and
Georgia law on trade secrets claim).
35. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1994 & Supp. 11996).
36. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West Supp. 1999)
37. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 30, at 125.
38. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.A. § 909 (West Supp. 1999) (requiring notice for mask
19981
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that a notice requirement maximizes the usage of those intellectual
products that are freely available. Notice also prevents recipients
of non-free information from unwisely investing in it by building
upon it or commercializing it. Courts could make the EEA con-
form to this tradition by holding that owners who do not extract
promises of confidentiality from those who are privy to their se-
crets have not taken reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.3 9
The next consideration is commercial morality. Many state
intellectual property laws grew and are explained in part by the
notion that unauthorized appropriation is immoral. 4" To the extent
that this theme is still in play, decisions on what is reasonable un-
der the EEA should be informed by norms of appropriate behavior.
The focus would be on the behavior of would-be copyists and on
what activities owners need to guard against. Owners should not
be required to anticipate actions that deviate appreciably from so-
cial norms, but they should reasonably safeguard their valuable in-
formation from behavior that complies with general commercial
standards.
The last consideration is, as discussed below, somewhat more
controversial. It conceptualizes the law as aimed at saving holders
of trade secrets from engaging in activities that represent pure so-
cial losses, losses that do not contribute to innovation, yet substan-
tially increase the cost of bringing new technology to market.4'
works); 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1994 & Supp. 1 1996) (requiring notice for patents); 15
U.S.C.A. § 1111 (West 1998) (requiring notice for trademarks); 17 U.S.C.A. § 405 (West
Supp. 1999) (detailing notice of copyrights). For notice requirements in state trade se-
crecy laws, see UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1(2)(B)(II), (Ill), 14 U.L.A. 433, 438
(1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41(b)(1), (2) (1995).
39. Arguably, there may be times when secrecy is best maintained by not high-
lighting the value of particular information. If so, then there should be a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the absence of a confidentiality agreement means that reasonable efforts
have not been taken.
40. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)
(holding that the doctrine of unclean hands does not attach to the taking of published
news items as tips to be investigated); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Re-
corder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (holding that the allegation of an unau-
thorized recording of a performance was sufficiently alleged cause of action for unfair
competition), affd, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div. 1951).
41. See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law: Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV.
888, 947 (1964) (presenting arguments for and against the common law protection of
trade secrets).
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Under this approach, the reasonableness of a measure depends on
the cost of instituting it. Things that are relatively inexpensive to
do are "reasonable" and therefore required. Examples of such in-
clude disclosing information to employees only on a need-to-know
basis, or procuring nondisclosure agreements from those who are
privy to secret information. Expensive measures, such as building
elaborate fortresses, sweeping the workplace for listening devices,
and the like, are not "reasonable" and are thus not required .
B. Unauthorized Appropriation
In many ways, the definition of the "bad act" is the most prob-
lematic feature of the EEA. The statute reaches the conduct of
anyone who:
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, car-
ries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice or deception
obtains a trade secret;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches,
draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys,
photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails,
communicates, or conveys a trade secret;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the
same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or con-
verted without authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of the
paragraphs (1) through (3).3
Interpreting these provisions will be tricky because they pro-
hibit activity that is not mentioned in the corresponding sections of
the Restatement or the UTSA. The Restatement's definition in-
cludes "theft, fraud, unauthorized interception of communications,
inducement of or knowing participation in a breach of confi-
42. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.
1970) (holding that aerial photography. of plant construction would be an "improper
means" of obtaining another's trade secret); James H.A. Pooley et al., Understanding the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 217-18 (1997) (identi-
fying guidelines that have emerged from case law for the protection of trade secrets).
43. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1831(a) (West 1998). The Act also punishes conspiracies. See
18 U.S.C.A. § 1832(a)(5) (West 1998)
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dence."" The UTSA covers "theft, bribery, misrepresentation,
breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or
espionage through electronic or other means. 45
One problem is derived from the interpretation of "reasonable
means." The proposition that trade secrecy laws are intended to
require holders to undertake only inexpensive measures to main-
tain secrecy draws support from the kinds of activities that the
states have regarded as misappropriation, namely, activities that
would be expensive to guard against. In contrast, the EEA covers
rather mundane activities. If these are the sorts of things that are
now considered bad acts, then it is difficult to imagine what sorts
of activities should reasonably be undertaken to prevent them.
A second problem with these provisions is that they appear to
encompass activity that states have traditionally considered lawful.
For example, is memorizing information a form of unauthorized
appropriation? The EEA does not mention memorization, but it
includes "communication" and "conveyance," implying that un-
lawful takings can include takings that are not embodied in any
physical product. In contrast, some state courts do not regard
memorizing as improper activity because they do not want trade
secrecy law to destroy the ability of employees to benefit from the
skills they learn on their jobs.46 Other states do not make this dis-
tinction, choosing to protect employee mobility in other ways.47
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995). That section also
includes a broader category of "means either wrongful in themselves or wrongful under
the circumstances of the case." Id.
45. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 433, 438 (1985). Other parts of
section 1 cover disclosure to others and uses following disclosure by others.
46. See, e.g., Inflight Newspapers, Inc. v. Magazines In-Flight, LLC, 990 F. Supp.
119, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that the defendant "should be allowed to use the skills
and knowledge he acquired in his overall experience at Inflight"); Reed, Roberts Assocs.,
Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 594 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that where former em-
ployee's knowledge did not qualify for protection as a trade secret, there was no com-
mercial piracy of the customer list); Ivy Mar Co., Inc. v. C.R. Seasons Ltd., 907 F. Supp.
547, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that no trade secret protection exists for customer lists
that are recalled, unless the information was memorized intentionally); Abraham Zion
Corp. v. Libo, 593 F. Supp. 551, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating mere recollection of cus-
tomer information is not actionable); Darby Drug Co., Inc. v. Zlotnick, 573 F. Supp. 661,
663 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that "had Zlotnick simply memorized the names of custom-
ers, it could hardly be said that he thereby acted tortiously.").
47. See, e.g., American Republic Ins. Co. v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 295 F.
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Courts addressing the question will be forced to decide whether to
follow the law of a state, which raises the choice of law question,
or to interpret the provisions of the EEA as a matter of federal law.
In the latter case, they will need to be sensitive to the employee
mobility issue, which I discuss in more detail in Part 11.
41
Another interpretive question is more serious. Some com-
mentators have argued that by prohibiting activities like copying,
duplicating, sketching, drawing, photographing, downloading, and
photocopying, the EEA means to outlaw reverse engineering. 9
Although that interpretation strikes most observers as rather un-
likely, it is not difficult to see how commentators come to that
conclusion. The secrecy of information is a relative matter. On
one end of the spectrum is information that is obvious upon in-
spection, the color of an orange is an example. At the other end is
information that cannot be learned from just looking at the prod-
ucts that the information produces. For instance, a process for rid-
ding orange groves of weeds cannot be learned by examining the
oranges grown in the grove. In the middle is information that can
be learned only through careful scrutiny. By prohibiting specific
methods of scrutiny, the EEA can be read to imply that anything
that requires that kind of examination is a trade secret within the
meaning of the Act. That would, for example, include the kind of
activity challenged in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.5-
downloading a program, decompiling it, copying it, and then using
interface information to create rival products. Yet these are all ac-
tions that were considered lawful by the Sega court, by the Re-
statement, and by the UTSA." They are also the activities that
Supp. 553, 555 (D. Or. 1969) (stating that the basis for trade secret protection is the
breach of a confidential relationship); McKinzie v. Cline, 252 P.2d 564 (Or. 1953)
(holding that a confidential obligation of good faith protects an investor against one to
whom invention has been disclosed).
48. The difference in state approaches could also raise the question of whether the
defendant received constitutionally adequate notice of the crime. See infra note 102 and
accompanying text.
49. See Pooley et al., supra note 42, at 195.
50. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995) (specifically
providing that the "analysis of publicly available products or information are not im-
proper means of acquisition"); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 433, 438
(1985).
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permit the development of a competitive marketplace for computer
games.
Of course, in deciding whether the EEA means to outlaw re-
verse engineering, courts should clearly not consider themselves
bound by state law because the language of the statute is unique.
Furthermore, the EEA is not limited by the same constitutional
constraints under which state law operates. Thus, while the Su-
preme Court decided in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc.5 ' that states cannot prohibit reverse engineering, the case does
not directly impose such a limit on Congress. Congress is, how-
ever, bound by constitutional limitations of its own. Furthermore,
even if the legislators drafting the EEA were not overly concerned
with innovation policy, courts should construe ambiguous lan-
guage in the legislation to make the statute consistent with other
intellectual property initiatives. From that perspective, it is clearly
wrong to interpret the EEA as suggested. Reverse engineering is
one of the most important ways in which trade secrets expire. If
reverse engineering were prohibited, trade secrets would endure
until they were rediscovered-which could be for long enough to
violate the limited-times provision of the Copyright Clause. 3
Longer protection for trade secrets would also enhance their value
relative to patents, which expire twenty years after the applications
on which they are based are filed. Since trade secrets are cheaper
to acquire than patents, this interpretation might lead inventors of
patentable inventions to forego patenting in favor of keeping trade
secrets. That would be socially undesirable. Patents disclose in-
formation for use during the patent term and enable the public to
freely use the protected technology after expiration. Trade secrets
do neither. In Bonito Boats and in an earlier case, Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp.,4 the Supreme Court warned that states should
not structure their trade secrecy laws in a way that encourages their
52. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
53. To be sure, Congress did not enact the EEA under its copyright authority, but it
is unlikely that the Supreme Court would allow it to avoid this constitutional limitation
by utilizing the Commerce Clause. Cf Railway Executors Assn. v Gibbons, 455 U.S.
457 (1982) (holding that non-uniform bankruptcy laws cannot be enacted pursuant to the
commerce power as a way to avoid limitations in the Bankruptcy Clause).
54. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
[Vol.9:1
THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996
use over patents.5 Although the federal government is, again, not
strictly bound by these cases, the Supreme Court's insight surely
has broader application: Congress should also be wary of struc-
turing law that encourages innovators to disregard the patent sys-
tem. To put this another way, criminalizing reverse engineering
would upset the basic bargain of intellectual property law. It
would take material that was formerly considered public, such as
the material that Sega considered public, into the domain of the
.private. And, as one commentator has noted, it is not even so clear
that the drafters of the EEA intended that reverse engineering be
considered unlawful.56
A closer question on reverse engineering may, however, soon
reach the courts in the form of an investigation of whether Reuters
Holdings P.L.C. misappropriated information from Bloomberg
L.P. One reported version of the facts states that Reuters acquired
the information at issue through a consultant who subscribed to
Bloomberg's service and then used the materials in violation of a
contractual prohibition against reverse engineering.57 There is,
again, some controversy as to whether the EEA was meant to ban
the use of expertise to dissect publicly distributed product. There
55. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974).
56. See Darren S. Tucker, Comment, The Federal Government's War on Espionage,
18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1109, 1143 (1997). Tucker relies on the following statement
by Senator Kohl: "If someone has lawfully gained access to a trade secret and can repli-
cate it without violating copyright, patent or [the EEA], then that form of 'reverse engi-
neering' should be fine." 142 CONG. REC. S12212-13 (daily ed. Oct. 2 1996) (statement
of Sen. Kohl), cited in 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. at 1143. It is not clear how much
weight this statement should be given. First, not all courts feel bound by remarks ap-
pearing in the Record. More importantly, since the issue here is what violates the EEA,
the remark says nothing. See also 142 CONG. REC. S12212 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Kohl) (stating in effect, that the Act is meant to reach "flagrant and
egregious cases of information theft"). The House Report also mentions the problem:
"[I]nformation which is generally known to the public, or which the public can readily
ascertain through proper means, does not satisfy the definition of a trade secret under this
section." H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 31 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021,
4032. Furthermore, the statutory defining of a trade secret also incorporates the notion of
"not being readily ascertainable through proper means." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3)(B) (West
1998). However, since the issue is what is proper, these statements beg the question.
57. See Lorin L. Reisner, Criminal Prosecution of Trade Secret Theft, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 30, 1998, at 1, 6.
58. See id. at 6 (quoting 142 CONG. REc. S12212 (daily, ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (Man-
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is also a question whether such a restriction would survive a pre-
emption challenge. Bonito Boats would seem to say that enforce-
ment of the restriction would be preempted,59 but strong arguments
have been made by, among others, the drafters of Article 2B that
bargained-for obligations are analytically different from the statu-
tory situation analyzed by the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats. The
drafters argue that "[a] contract defines rights between parties to
the agreement, while a property right creates rights against all the
world. They are not equivalent. ' 6° If an effective bar on reverse
engineering can be imposed contractually, it is difficult to see why
a breach of such an obligation should not be treated like any other
breach-as an improper way in which to acquire a trade secret.6'
The activities involved certainly match the description in the EEA.
Another worrisome aspect of the EEA's definition of a "bad
act" is that it criminalizes attempts.62 The interpretation of the pro-
vision could have a big impact on innovation. Thus, in the "worst-
case scenario", the government would be able to prosecute people
who engage in one or more of the prohibited activities even when
there is no secret information available for them to take. The stat-
ute would, under this interpretation, be unique to intellectual prop-
erty law because it would create the only situation in which a de-
fendant could not defend on the ground that the right itself is
invalid.63 It would build fences around companies like Sega and
ager's Statement that there is no violation "if a person can look at a product and, by using
their own general skills and expertise, dissect the necessary attributes of the product.").
59. 'See, e.g., Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 160 ("If [the State] may prohibit this par-
ticular method of study and recomposition of an unpatented article, we fail to: see the
principle that would prohibit the State from banning the use of chromatography in the
reconstitution of unpatentable chemical compounds, or the use of robotics in the duplica-
tion of machinery in the public domain.").
60. U.C.C. § 2B, supra note 10, at Preface at 13 (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)) (emphasis in original). See also Dreyfuss, Do You Want to
Know a Trade Secret?, supra note 14.
61. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §1(1), 14 U.L.A 433,438 (1985).
62. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831(4), 1832(4) (West 1998). Similar comments can be
made about conspiracies, which are covered by subsection (5) of each of these provi-
sions.
63. Under the Lanham Act, trademarks registered for more than five consecutive
years can become incontestable, but only with respect to certain defenses. See 15
U.S.C.A. § 1065 (West 1998). Private control over trademarks does not have the same
impact on innovation as does private control over other technologies.
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around their products, even if they are not, in fact; -prticularly in-
novative. The flow of information between firms would, as a re-
suit, be curtailed and the utilization of information that is public
and free to all would decrease.
The question, then, is whether this scenario is likely. The in-
terpretation is supported to some extent by one of the few EEA
prosecutions reported to date, United States v. Hsu.64 The defen-
dants there were charged with unauthorized conveyance of the
formula and processes for manufacturing Taxol and with attempt-
ing to misappropriate this secret information from its developer,
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company ("Bristol-Myers"). In the course
of preparing for trial, the defendants asked to review Taxol tech-
nology documents and the government resisted. The statute spe-
cifically provides for protective orders to prevent public disclosure
of trade secrets during trial;65 the prosecution wanted that order
structured so that the defendants and their lawyers could not learn
any Bristol-Myers technology. The government argued that the le-
gal impossibility of committing the crime is not a defense, and if
the defendants could not win by proving that the material sought
did not qualify as secret, then details about the technology were ir-
relevant and immaterial.66 The Third Circuit agreed. After noting
that the EEA is an attempt to provide a "'comprehensive' mecha-
nism for curtailing the escalating threat to corporate espionage," 67
the court stated, "we find it highly unlikely that Congress would
have wanted the courts to thwart that solution by permitting defen-
dants to assert the common law defense of legal impossibility. 68
The court concluded that "[i]t naturally flows that the government
need not prove that an actual trade secret was used., 69 In addition,
the court noted that the defendants' view would lead to a "bizarre"
result: the government would have to disclose secrets to the very
64. 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998).
65. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1835 (West 1998). The orders must be consistent with the
Federal Rules of Evidence, Civil and Criminal Procedure.
66. Details of the prosecution are found in United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022,
1023 (E.D. Pa. 1997), rev'd, 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998).
67. Hsu, 155 F.3d at 201 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 202.
69. Id. at 203.
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people accused of stealing them." But whatever the merits of this
position, the decision on impossibility seems to create a situation
where taking even public information could serve as the basis for a
prosecution.
This is not, however, the only way to interpret Hsu or the EEA.
The Hsu prosecution was based on a sting operation: the defen-
dants were trying to take genuine trade secrets, but the government
sought to establish the crime by handing out so-called "dummy"
technology."' Because the EEA was, in part, inspired by sting op-
erations that the government had conducted under other criminal
statutes," it was consistent with the legislative history for the judge
to interpret the EEA in a way that preserved the viability of this
method of apprehending economic espionage agents. There was,
however, no real argument in Hsu that the government was re-
lieved of an obligation to prove that Bristol-Myers possessed secret
technology." Thus, the case need not stand for the position that the
government can prosecute even in situations where a target has
nothing worth taking.74
70. See id. at 202.
71. See Hsu, 982 F. Supp. at 1023. There is, apparently, some question whether the
documents passed were real or fake. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 192-93 (noting that the in-
dictment alleged that the documents contained trade secrets). But see id. at 202 (assum-
ing government would not pass genuine information).
72. See Tucker, supra note 56, at 1119 (describing a case involving IBM and Hi-
tachi). See Harry First, Protecting Soft Property Through the Criminal Law: The
Emerging View from the United States, 2 NIHON U. COMP. L. 1 (1985).
73. See Hsu, 982 F. Supp. at 1024. See also supra note 71.
74. For further discussion, see infra note 81 and accompanying text. Hsu is trouble-
some for two other reasons. First, it is probably the tip of the iceberg on difficult discov-
ery issues that the EEA will create. Second, if the court is right, and the government can
give allegedly secret documents to suspected misappropriators, how will the requirement
that targets take reasonable measures to maintain secrecy be established? It is also worth
noting that courts manage to handle the disclosure problem in civil trade secrecy litiga-
tion without depriving defendants of a crucial defense. Information can be redacted,
shown only to the lawyers, or the defense reviewed by the court alone.
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C. State of Mind
Most intellectual property violations do not turn on knowledge
or intent, except as an enhancement of relief.75 Accordingly, the
state-of-mind provisions of the EEA will require courts to consider
factors they have not been previously required to address in the
intellectual property area.76
This is where the origins of the statute as a measure to combat
the activities of foreign espionage agents can best be detected.
Thus, the statute draws a distinction between acts undertaken on
behalf of foreign governments and acts undertaken for private gain.
In the former case, the government must show that the defendant,
"intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign
government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly"
engaged in the acts described in the previous section.77 For other
cases, the statute punishes:
Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is re-
lated to or included in a product that is produced for or
placed in interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic
benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and in-
tending or knowing that the offense will, injure any owner
of that secret, knowingly [engages in the acts described in
the previous section] .78
The interesting question is whether these several state-of-mind
elements will impose limits that make up for the broad interpreta-
tion to which the rest of the EEA is susceptible. It seems unlikely.
75. See, e.g., De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944) (holding that an in-
fringement action lies even if defendant did not know that the work copied was copy-
righted). As noted in the text, courts can increase damages on proof that the infringement
was willful. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994 & Supp. 1 1996); 15 U.S.C.A. § 504 (West
1998).
76. To put this more precisely, the EEA will require courts to make distinctions that
the Supreme Court has, in some circumstances, declared impossible. See War-
ner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) ("At a mini-
mum, one wonders how ever to distinguish between the intentional copyist making minor
changes to lower the risk of legal action, and the incremental innovator designing around
the claims, yet seeking to capture as much as is permissible of the patented advance.").
77. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1831 (West 1998).
78. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1832 (West 1998).
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On the government-entity side, there are ostensibly only two
state-of-mind requirements: that the defendant intend or know that
the offense will benefit a foreign entity, and that the defendant
know she is engaged in one of the named activities. As discussed
above, the named activities are so mundane; showing that the de-
fendant intended to engage in them will pose no real bar to prose-
cution. The "benefit" provision is also not likely to constrain the
EEA very much. This section does not modify the term "benefit"
by the word "economic," as does the private-entity provision. Ac-
cording to the legislative history, Congress intended to include
rather amorphous benefits, such as reputational, strategic, and tac-
tical advantages.7 9 That means almost anything could qualify as a
benefit. It is, however, arguable that the proviso "intending or
knowing that the offense will benefit" foreign entities interposes a
third element-that the government show that the defendant had
intended to commit an offense because the defendant targeted a
genuine trade secret for taking. If that interpretation is adopted,
then the EEA may have some limits. s The language is, however,
rather ambiguous on this point.
On 'the private-entity side, the government needs to establish
several elements, but here too, the limits they interpose may be
somewhat illusory. The government must demonstrate that the de-
fendant intended to convert a trade secret and intended to benefit
someone other than the owner, had intent or knowledge that the in-
formation will injure an owner of the trade secret, and knew that
she was engaged in a denominated act.8' As with the government-
entity provision, it is unlikely that the prosecution will have trouble
proving that the defendant knew she was committing one of the
specified acts. The better interpretation of Hsu is that the govern-
ment must show that the activity at issue was intentionally targeted
at a genuine trade secret as defined by the EEA, even in cases
79. See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 11 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021,
4030; Mossinghoffet al., supra note 13, at 198.
80. The question of whether they are sufficient is discussed infra at Part II.
81. Arguably, the government must also show that the defendant knew that the trade
secret was in a product in interstate or foreign commerce. Although the legislative his-
tory recites this requirement, the description of the state-of-mind elements omits it, mak-
ing it appear that this language is there for jurisdictional purposes only. See H.R. REP.
No. 104-788, at 10-11 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4029-30.
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where the actual information with which the defendant dealt was
dummy technology. The statute does not, however, require that
reading. A defendant can intend to take a trade secret even if she
is mistaken about whether the technology in question is secret.
Even more worrisome is the possibility that the government
will try to prosecute a defendant who believed she was learning
material that exists in the public domain. That interpretation of the
statute comes from a passage in its legislative history, which indi-
cates that even a defendant who was erroneous in her belief about
the status of the material taken can, in some instances, be consid-
ered to possess the requisite state of mind.82
Admittedly, that passage comes from the Senate Report on a
bill that was modified before it became the EEA; as enacted, the
EEA talks of the "intent to convert a trade secret."83 The draft bill
did not. Moreover, it is probable that the Senate simply failed to
consider how difficult it can be for an actor to determine whether a
technology is, in fact, a trade secret-to consider, for example, that
the adequacy of the target's efforts to maintain secrecy is uniquely
within the knowledge of the target. One hopes that courts will not
utilize this passage to water down the intent elements of the statute,
and that instead the prosecution will be required to show that the
defendant's intent actually was to take a material "secret" within
the meaning of the statute.
82. The Senate Report states:
A knowing state of mind with respect to an element-of the offense is (1) an
awareness of the nature of one's conduct, and (2) an awareness of or a firm be-
lief in or knowledge to a substantial certainty of the existence of a relevant cir-
cumstance, such as whether the information is proprietary economic informa-
tion as defined by the statute. The statute does not require proof that the actor
knew that his conduct violated Federal law. The Committee intends that the
knowing state of mind requirement may be satisfied by proof that the actor was
aware of a high probability of the existence of the circumstance, although a de-
fense should succeed if it is proven that the actor actually and reasonably be-
lieved that the circumstance did not exist. ... This approach deals with the
situation that has been called willful blindness, the case of the actor who is
aware of the probable existence of a material fact - for example, that he has no
authority, or that the information is proprietary - but does not satisfy himself
that it does not in fact exist.
S. REP. No. 104-359, at 39-40 (1996) (emphasis added).
83. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1832 (West 1998).
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Next, there is the question of interpreting the requirement that
the prosecution demonstrate an intention to benefit someone other
than the owner and an intent or knowledge of injury. Here, the
statute does appear to limit benefits and injury to economic reper-
cussions. But even so, there is substantial room to maneuver. The
common conception of a trade secret is a positive technology, for
example, the process for manufacturing Taxol, which, when util-
ized, will create a profitable product for the acquirer's beneficiary
and undermine the market position of the technology's developer.
In some instances, however, much less of a transfer has been con-
sidered to raise competitive concerns. Thus, courts have recog-
nized that there are economic benefits in learning no more than
that a research path is fruitless.84 Since the cost of research is built,
into the price of goods sold, courts that see "negative know-how"
as conferring a benefit should also see its acquisition as inflicting
an injury. Similarly, a firm can benefit just by hiring an employee
who knows its competitor's strategies. The firm may not choose to
duplicate the strategy, but it is somewhat inevitable that the em-
ployee will help direct the firm's activities in a way that under-
mines the competitor's planned tactics." Again, courts that recog-
nize "inevitable disclosure" as a benefit should also see it as
creating injury. Both interpretations, if adopted for the EEA, will
substantially increase its scope."
The other potential issue on the private side is the question of
why the statute defines "owners" to include not only trade secrecy
holders but also licensors.8" Some commentators have suggested
that Congress included the term "licensor" so that the government
could use the statute to prosecute breaches of licensing agree-
ments.8 If that is the way courts read the EEA, prosecutions could
84. See Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197, 1217
(D. Utah 1998).
85. See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
former employer was entitled to a preliminary injunctive relief under the Illinois Trade
Secret Act because disclosure to competitor was inevitable if former employee accepted
employment with competitor).
86. See Joseph F. Savage, Jr., The New Economic Espionage Act can be Risky Busi-
ness, 12 CRIM. JUST. 12, 15 (Fall 1997).
87. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(4) (West 1998). See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
88. See Mossinghoff et al., supra note 13, at 198.
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produce some surprising results. Consider, for example, a con-
tractor who produces sweaters on knitting machines programmed
to make a novel pattern. The license requires the production of
five thousand garments, but the licensee produces ten percent extra
in anticipation that some of the garments will be rejected. What
happens if some of these extras work their way on to the market:
should selling the overrun to recover the cost of production be con-
sidered a crime? Significantly, prior law has taken a rather benign
view of this activity. Although the licensee would be breaching
the contract, contract law does not usually impose punitive reme-
dies. Even the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 excludes
overruns from criminal coverage.89 Nonetheless, the argument that
the EEA does penalize this conduct cannot be ignored. The United
States has been extremely active in protecting trademark holders
from this sort of infringement, particularly in foreign countries. 90
Given the statute's unique extraterritorial reach, courts may have a
hard time resisting this interpretation.
The final question concerns how the EEA will be applied to
employers. Both the government and private-entity provisions im-
pose high penalties on organizations committing the described of-
fenses. The statute does not specify the circumstances in which
this can occur. One can surmise, however, that, as in other situa-
tions where corporations face criminal prosecution, a firm will be
criminally liable for the acts of its agents that are conducted within
the scope of their authority and for the benefit of the firm.9'
Avoiding this liability may not be easy. Employees in high-tech
firms are under a great deal of pressure to produce. There have
been instances where an employee has taken information learned
89. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320(e) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998).
90. See generally, James A.R. Nafziger, NAFTA 's Regime for Intellectual Property:
In the Mainstream of Public International Law, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 807 (1997) (arguing
that NAFTA's intellectual property protections are an example of the cooperation among
Western nations); Kenyon S. Jenckes, Protection of Foreign Copyrights in China: The
Intellectual Property Courts and Alternative Avenues of Protection, 5 S. CAL.
INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 551 (1997) (discussing the efforts of the United States to influ-
ence the enforcement of copyright laws in China).
91. See, e.g., New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. U.S., 212 U.S. 481
(1909) (holding that an agent acting under the authority delegated to him may be con-
trolled by imputing the actions to the employer and subsequently imposing penalties upon
the corporation).
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on one job and used it in another employer's project. Although
this may have been done without specific direction from that em-
ployer, it was nonetheless for the new employer's benefit and to
the detriment of the earlier employer." If this sort of activity is
now regarded as criminal, employers may need to institute cross-
examination procedures whenever a new employee makes what
appears to be a breakthrough, just to make sure that the work is in
no way dependent on information learned on a previous job-and
even to ensure that the employee did not rely on prior experience
to avoid blind alleys. In fact, commentators are recommending in-
tricate compliance plans, including elaborate exit and entry inter-
views and rigid insulation of new employees from those working
in areas where the new employee was previously engaged. 93 These
activities may be costly. They may lead a firm to reject an appli-
cant with expertise that would improve that firm's research efforts.
information walls will certainly disrupt the flow of information
within firms. It is hard to see how any of this will improve the
creative environment or enhance innovation.
D. Extraterritoriality
Unlike intellectual property laws, which are territorially lim-
ited, the EEA applies to conduct occurring outside the United
States whenever:
(1) the offender is a natural person who is a citizen or per-
manent resident alien of the United States, or an organiza-
tion organized under the laws of the United States or a
State or political subdivision thereof; or
(2) an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in
92. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
93. See, e.g., Savage, supra note 86, at 17 (suggesting strategies for dealing with
clients seeking protection from the EEA); Pooley et al., supra note 42, at 224 (same);
Mossinghoff et al., supra note 13, at 205 (same). Compliance schemes also are advanta-
geous because their existence can reduce penalties under the federal sentencing guide-
lines. See Thomas M. Kerr, "Trade Secrets." I.E., Confidential Business Information or
Business Intelligence, 145 PrrrSBURGH LEGAL J. 27 (Dec. 1997); Ronald Abramson,
Economic Espionage Act of 1996; Theft of Trade Secrets Addressed, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 28,
1997, at S1 ("These and other possibilities for institutional violations suggest the possible
need to include compliance efforts in this area in an 'effective program to prevent and
detect violations of the law' under § 8A1.2 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.").
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the United States.94
The general debate on how far one nation can regulate conduct
in another jurisdiction is well beyond the scope of this Essay.95 But
it is worth noting that attempts to criminalize commercial activity
occurring elsewhere have, from time to time, led to significant po-
litical repercussions for the United States and to the institution of
countermeasures by foreign governments.96 In the context of in-
tellectual property rights, extraterritorial applications are particu-
larly problematic. First, intellectual works have cultural implica-
tions. Not every country takes the same view on whether it is
moral to create proprietary rights in intellectual efforts. Moreover,
some nations reject the idea of applying the theory of competitive
advantage to cultural matters when the result could be the domina-
tion of their cultures by countries with more developed innovation
industries. 9 In addition, the export of U.S.-style intellectual prop-
erty law could intellectually handicap less developed countries, re-
94. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1837 (West 1998).
95. There is extensive choice-of-law literature on the subject. For the debate as it
pertains to intellectual property, see Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Terri-
toriality in Intellectual Property: Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603
(1997); Curtis Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism,
37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505 (1997).
96. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, The Helms-Burton Act and Transnational Legal
Process, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 713 (1997) (comparing the controversy
surrounding the Helms-Burton Act to the Fruehauf case of the mid-1960s and the Soviet
Pipeline dispute of the early 1980s); Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States:
Liberal Internationalism and The Act of State Doctrine, 92 CoLuM.L.REV. 1907 (1992)
(using a distinction between "liberal" and "non-literal" states to analyze transnational le-
gal relations among private individuals and between individuals and state entities); Rus-
sell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An
Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799 (1992)
(examining the problems associated with applying American antitrust and securities laws
to conduct occurring outside the United States).
97. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Compe-
tition Under the TRIPs Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11 (1997) (arguing that
developing countries will gain by becoming fair followers); Judith Beth Prowda, U.S.
Dominance in the "Marketplace of Culture" and the French "Cultural Exception," 29
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 193 (1997) (discussing the underlying values of the debate
over the French "cultural exception" that limits broadcasting of non-European audiovis-
ual works); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cul-
tural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (discussing the challenges
to the traditional concept of property that arise from the growth of digital information
technology).
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quiring these nations to pay supracompetitive prices in order to
come up to world intellectual standards. This is something that
currently developed countries were not always forced to do.98
Furthermore, foreign enforcement of the EEA may lead to ac-
cusations that the United States is trying to end-run the 1994
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPs Agreement").99 The TRIPs Agreement requires
every member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") to protect undisclosed information.' ° However, it also
includes special transition arrangements that give developing na-
tions time in which to conform their law and legal practice.'0 '
These provisions were very carefully negotiated; if the United
States can, for example, prosecute the knitting contractor discussed
in the previous section under the EEA when it could not bring an
action against the country in which the contractor is operating un-
der TRIPs, then these negotiations will have provided developing
countries with very little of the temporal benefits they thought they
had bargained for.
The extraterritorial application of the EEA will also give rise to
some difficult procedural questions. As noted above, there is a de-
gree of fluidity in the way that the elements of an EEA case are de-
fined. If courts decide to defer to local law on some of these mat-
ters, then difficult choice of law questions will arise, especially in
countries that have not yet conformed their law to the TRIPs
Agreement and in nations that are not participants in GATT. Even
if deference is put to one side, there will be hard conflicts of laws
issues. Could, for example, someone be prosecuted under the EEA
for activity that is not considered unlawful in the country in which
it is committed? What about activity that is expressly privileged
under the intellectual property laws of the nation in which it oc-
98. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achieve-
ments of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPs and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J.
INT'L L. 275 (1997) (using a series of hypothetical cases to examine the "Understanding
on Dispute Settlement").
99. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 33
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
100. See TRIPs Agreement art. 39, 33 I.L.M. at 1212-13.
101. See id. arts. 65-66, 33 I.L.M. at 1222.
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curred? If nothing else, it seems hard to believe that a defendant
who committed an act (such as reverse engineering) in a country
where that act (copying) is privileged would have constitutionally
adequate notice that she was committing, a crime.0°
Finally, there will be issues of proof. Trade secrets are almost
by definition used in secret. Without a right to discovery abroad,
the government may have difficulty proving its case. More sig-
nificantly, defendants may have trouble mounting their defenses.
For instance, it may be difficult to acquire the evidence necessary
to show that the alleged target's information was not a trade secret
or that the target had failed to take reasonable measures to keep its
technology secret."3
E. Punishment
The EEA imposes four types of punishment. First, individuals
can be fined up to $500,000, imprisoned for up to fifteen years, or
both for activities that benefit a foreign government; there is also a
maximum fine and ten years imprisonment for activities benefiting
private entities.' °4  Second, organizations can be fined up to
$10,000,000 and $5,000,000, respectively, for these crimes.' °
Third, a court can order forfeiture property if it meets certain re-
quirements.' 6 Finally, the government can institute federal civil
102. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979) (declaring that a
criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that the
contemplated conduct is forbidden is void for vagueness); Savage, supra note 86, at 14
(commenting that the EEA explicitly prohibits the improper "use" of information).
103. But cf. In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 1998) (upholding discovery of
foreign documents under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) for use in foreign litigation whenever the
substance of discovery is not objectionable under comity principles). Bayer's emphasis
on "providing equitable and efficacious discovery" in international contexts may be token
increased cooperation among jurisdictions in discovery matters. Id. at 195.
104. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831(a), 1832(a) (West 1998).
105. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831(b), 1832(b) (West 1998).
.106. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1834 (West 1998). The statute provides that a court can
order. forfeiture of:
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person ob-
tained, directly or indirectly, as the result of [a] violation; and )
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or
part, to commit or facilitate the commission of [a] violation, if the court in its
discretion so determines, taking into consideration the nature, scope, and pro-
portionality of the use of the property in the offense.
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actions for injunctions against violations of the EEA. 10 7
The problems with giving courts the amount of discretion the
EEA contemplates are obvious, notwithstanding the federal sen-
tencing guidelines."' Equally problematic are the numerous issues
that arise in connection with forfeiture statutes.'09 These issues are
especially complicated in light of the EEA's extraterritorial appli-
cation. It is hard to see what an American court can do to enjoin
acts occurring abroad or to seize assets that are located abroad
without risking serious international consequences.
Forfeiture of property derived from the receipt of a trade se-
crets is especially troubling. The scope of infringement is not as
clear in trade secrecy law as it is in patent cases (and even there, it
remains controversial.) More important, a trade secret can con-
stitute a very small part of a much larger invention. Confiscating
the invention or the profits derived from. that invention could be
grossly disproportionate to the technological contribution: of the
trade secret, yet the proportionality language of the statute applies
only to forfeiture of property used to commit the offense, not to
forfeiture of the benefits of the violation."' In a case where a firm
18 U.S.C.A. § 1834 (West 1998)
107. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 (West 1998).
108. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Miscon-
duct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (com-
paring the norm of vicarious liability with various types of duty-based liability regimes);
Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must be Restrained, and Other Lesson in
Learning to Love thetFederal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 679 (1996) (ex-
amining the federal sentencing guidelines and defending them against attack as "a dismal
failure"); Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, 207 N.Y.L.J., Feb.
11, 1992, at 2 discussing general disapproval of the sentencing guidelines);
109. See, e.g., Kaija Blalock et al., Procedural Issues, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 883
(1997) (considering white collar criminal litigation in detail); LEONARD W. LEVY, A
LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY (1996) (examining the origins, consti-
tutionality, and future of federal forfeiture statutes); Case Note, Double Jeopardy
Clause-In Rem Civil Forfeiture, 110 HARV. L. REV. 206 (1996) (discussing United
States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996), where the Supreme Court rejected the suggestion
that civil forfeitures constitute punishment and thus violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
when pursued alongside criminal prosecution).
110. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Company, Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520
U.S. 17 (1997) (interpreting the doctrine of equivalents in patent law).
111. See. Leslie G. Eferkowitz, The Economics Espionage Act of 1996: An Experi-
ment in Unintended Consequences?, 26 COLO. LAW. 47 (Dec. 1997).
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has a technology whose provenance is questionable, this provision
will make it risky to incorporate it into a larger product. Despite
the social disutility of reinventing something that already exists,
the firm might choose that course to avoid the possible forfeiture
of the benefits deriving from the larger work.
II. THE EEA AND FEDERAL INNOVATION POLICY
While the courts busy themselves sorting out the difficulties
involved in applying the EEA, it behooves the scholarly commu-
nity to consider the effects of this legislation on national policy.
Hopefully, our deliberations will influence how courts construe the
statute.
The most worrisome possibility is that the law will be inter-
preted in a manner that makes it actionable to learn and utilize
public information. That could happen if the definition of "secret"
is made too broad, if certain activities that constitute reverse engi-
neering are classified as unauthorized appropriation, if attempts in-
clude situations where the defendant is mistaken in his belief that
the target possesses trade secrets, or if employers become reluctant
to hire knowledgeable employees. If these interpretations are
adopted, the statute will have a substantial impact on prices, qual-
ity, and consumer choice. It was, after all, the ability to discover
and utilize the interfaces between Sega cassettes and consoles that
allowed competitors to enter the computer game market, drive
down the price of games, and give consumers a new set of materi-
als to play on their Sega consoles. Insulating firms from competi-
tion in non-secret information could also have a detrimental effect
on these firms' propensity to invest in innovation. That is, al-
though intellectual property is a method of encouraging creativity,
no one has suggested that Joseph Schumpeter's notion of competi-
tion-the "engine of creative destruction"-is not an equally pow-
erful mechanism."'
112. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Treble What?, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 95 (1986) (warn-
ing that antitrust laws are also sometimes misinterpreted in a manner that reduces com-
petition). See also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151
(1989) ("The attractiveness of [the patent law] bargain, and its effectiveness in inducing
creative effort and disclosure of the results of that effort, depend almost entirely on a
backdrop of free competition in the exploitation of unpatented designs and innova-
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Even if the EEA is interpreted more narrowly, it could exert
significant effects on innovation. To the extent that Congress
thought about the creative environment, it apparently assumed that
if strong proprietary rights are good, then stronger rights must be
better: if trade secrecy protection is currently weak, then adding a
new level of deterrence will be an improvement." 3 The problem
here is that the logic is wrong-more is not always better."
4
One factor was alluded to above. Innovators choose where to
allocate their efforts and what intellectual property regimes to rely
upon when their efforts pan out."5 Because trade secrets have al-
ways been vulnerable to leaks, to independent discovery, and to
reverse engineering, patents have had the greater allure despite
their cost and relatively short term. With the EEA, the calculus
shifts. Because it deters attempts to figure out what competitors
are doing, the EEA allows developers to hide their trade secrets
more effectively than before. With less vulnerability to leaks and
reverse engineering chilled, the trade secrets of the future will only
be acquired through independent invention-making them dis-
tinctly better than patents."'6
And yet, the public interest has always been thought to favor
patents and patented technology. For example, Bonito Boats em-
phasized that federal policy is to encourage the kind of inventive-
ness that yields patents. Thus, in invalidating a Florida statute that
prohibited a cheap method of copying unpatentable boat hull tech-
nology, the Supreme Court stated that, "given the substantial pro-
tection offered by the Florida scheme, we cannot dismiss as hypo-
thetical the possibility that it will become a significant competitor
tions.").
113. See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 12-14, 18 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021,4030-32.
114. Or, as Ludwig Mies van der Rohe once said, less is more. See Mies van der
Rohe, Back to Basics, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 1997, at 84.
115. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; Dreyfuss, Do You Want to Know a
Trade Secret?, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
116. Even independent invention might not be enough to avoid prosecution because
it can sometimes be difficult to demonstrate. Of course, the government bears the burden
of proof, but the chill produced by the difficulties inherent in the case should not be ig-
nored. Cf. Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 720 (2d Cir.
1992). In Computer Assocs., an attempt to redevelop a computer program through use of
a clean room procedure was entirely ignored by the court.
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to the federal patent laws, offering investors similar protection
without the quid pro quo of substantial creative effort required by
the federal statute.""' 7 The Court continued, offering that, "the
prospect of all fifty States establishing similar protections for pre-
ferred industries without the rigorous requirements of patentability
prescribed by Congress could pose a substantial threat to the patent
system's ability to accomplish its mission of promoting progress in
the useful arts.""' 8 Further, the Supreme Court in Kewanee warned
that federal policy would be undermined if people who did invent
patentable subject matter chose to hide their discoveries as trade
secrets. In the course of holding that state trade secrecy law is not
preempted by federal law, the Court stated: "If a State, through a
system of protection, were to cause a substantial risk that holders
of patentable inventions would not seek patents, but rather would
rely on the state protection, we would be compelled to hold that
such a system could not constitutionally continue to exist."" 9
Again, Congress is not directly bound by Bonito Boats or by
Kewanee.2 However, the rationales of these cases should be taken
seriously. If the EEA increases the risk that holders will not seek
patents, it may make state trade secrecy laws vulnerable to pre-
emption. More importantly, the public interest will be damaged.
Patents permit the public to monitor the use of new technologies,
to learn from the insights of others, and to avoid wasting resources
re-inventing something that others have invented before. 2' Trade
secrets do none of that.
The last observation points to what is really the fundamental is-
sue here: the weaknesses that Congress saw in trade secrecy are
not flaws in the trade secrecy system; they are there for a purpose.
Indeed, neither copyright law nor patent law creates a regime that
is especially strong; both are porous and "leak" material into a do-
117. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989).
118. Id. This is not to say that I agree with the Court's reasoning: I like gadgets.
119. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,489 (1974).
120. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
121. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994 & Supp 1996) (providing for the disclosure re-
quirement). See generally, Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and
Regulation, 23 N.M. L. REV. 1 (1993) (examining trade secrecy law in the context of the
regulation of chemical pollution); Dreyfuss, Do You Want to Know a Trade Secret?, su-
pra note 14.
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main where the public can access it for free. That structure is not
an accident. In fact, the economics of innovation requires it.
One reason to design a leaky regime is that giving innovators
more complete control would create what can be called an "offsets
quandary." Since progress depends on innovators building upon
the work of those who came before, innovator A's output is inno-
vator B's input. If A enjoys plenary rights over his innovation,
then he will be able to extract large rewards. But the encourage-
ment that this reward gives to A will be offset by the higher cost,
and obstruction, it produces for B. To avoid the offset problem,
patents and copyrights are purposefully weak. Patents are of rela-
tively short duration (twenty years) and patentees are encouraged
to surrender their rights through the maintenance-fee system.' In
addition, there is a well-developed misuse defense that can prevent
patentees from using their rights to block further developments.'23
Copyrights last much longer, but the statute recognizes a fair use
defense and creates several compulsory licenses, all of which have
the effect of allowing the Bs of the world to make productive and
socially important uses of protected works during the time they are
federally protected.1
4
Two other reasons for according innovators less than plenary
rights are the spillover and deadweight social loss problems.
These are interrelated in the following way. The social benefits of
innovation often derive from applications far outside the initial in-
novator's own field.'25 Since A may not appreciate all of the ways
122. See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 154-156 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998) (setting forth the du-
ration term); 35 U.S.C.A. § 41(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998) (providing for maintenance-
fees).
123. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (recognizing misuse doc-
trine); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeline Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) (discussing the
limits which the patentee must not exceed in employing the leverage of a patent to con-
trol or limit the operations of the licensee); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323
U.S. 386 (1945) (same). Copyright law also has a nascent misuse defense. See Laser-
comb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). See also DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995).
124. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West Supp. 1999) (fair use), 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 108-120
(other compulsory licenses).
125. See Zvi Griliches, R&D and Productivity: Econometric Results and Measure-
ment Issues, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL
[Vol.9:1
THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996
in which his innovation can be utilized, it is important that people
like B, with an expertise that is different from A's, have access to
A's insights. Of course, B could pay for this access. Unfortu-
nately, B may have a difficult time evaluating it to ascertain
whether it is worth what A is charging. Even if B can make the
evaluation, it is possible that the supracompetitive rate that A can
set will be more than the access is worth to B-and this could be
true even when B, and those who would benefit from B's utiliza-
tion, would be willing to pay a competitive price to use A's work.
To encourage spillover uses and reduce deadweight loss, copyright
law relies once again on fair use and patent law recognizes a lim-
ited experimental use defense.'26 Additionally, both regimes make
sure that the ideas underlying protected works are available for
study and use even during the time that applications of the ideas
are protected. The Copyright Act requires Americans to deposit
copies of their work in the Library of Congress.'27 The cost of pri-
vate copies is reduced through the first sale doctrine, and the
idea/expression dichotomy ensures that the ideas are immediately
made a part of the public domain."' Similarly, patent law has a
specification requirement to disclose underlying principles. The
first sale doctrine reduces the cost of copies, and the principles re-
vealed are considered public, not private.129
CHANGE 52, 63-74 (Paul Stoneman ed., 1995); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 46 (1990); David J. Teece, Profiting From
Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and
Public Policy, 15 RESEARCH POLICY 285 (1986).
126. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (codifying the experimental
use defense). Some commentators argue that the defense should be broader. See Re-
becca Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimen-
tal Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989).
127. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. See also 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 408 and
411 (West Supp. 1999) (detailing the requirement for registration), 17 U.S.C.A. § 407
(West Supp. 1999) (providing the procedures for the "deposit" of copies or phonore-
cords).
128. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 407 (West Supp. 1999) (providing the procedures for the
deposit of copies or phonorecords), 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(a) (first sale); Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99 (1879) (elucidating the idea/expression dichotomy).
129. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (specification); Adams v. Burke, 84
U.S. 453 (1873) (holding that there can be no restriction on the use of machines or im-
plements which are limited to one use when once they are lawfully made and sold);
Gottshchalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (principles/embodiment dichotomy). Both
regimes also make sure that only works of true intellectual value enjoy any degree of ex-
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Because it is largely a creature of the common law, trade se-
crecy law is less systematic than the federal statutory regimes.
However, what Congress saw as weakness is, in part, simply its
analogously porous texture. Traditional trade secrecy law protects
against misappropriation, but misappropriation is carefully defined
to exclude reverse engineering or learning the invention through
familiarity with its embodiment."O Like copyright law, trade se-
crecy law does not protect creators against independent inventors.
Moreover, it does not create rights against good faith purchasers.
As the right to use a trade secret is transferred to licensees, subli-
censees, and end-users, as embodiments of the secret change
hands, and as employees leave one job and go to another, there are
many opportunities for leakage. The traditional structure provides
innovators with a period of time in which to earn a return on their
investment, but the period of return is relatively short. Leakage
built into the system gives others the opportunity to find new uses
for the secret, to learn the principles that underlie it, and to deploy
those principles in new ways.
Eventually, it is true, the information becomes generally known
and it loses its status as a trade secret. But this is not an event that
should only be counted only as a business loss, as some in Con-
gress have viewed it. 3' It also represents a business gain because
the information becomes freely available for further development.
To put this another way, in enacting the EEA, Congress deplored
the fact that "civil penalties often are absorbed by the offender as a
cost of doing business and the stolen information retained for con-
clusivity. It is relatively easy to lose patentable subject matter to the public domain and
although both regimes create presumptions of validity, in neither does a right ever be-
come incontestable. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b),(c), (d) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (statutory bars
on patentability); 17 U.S.C.A. § 410(c) (West Supp. 1999) (presumption of copyright va-
lidity for works registered within five years of publication); 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994 &
Supp. 11996) (presumption of patent validity). For comparison, see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1065
(West 1998) (providing for trademark incontestability).
130. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995).
131. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 6 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4021, 4024 (estimating the potential losses at $63 million annually, but not mentioning
any gains that could come from using the "lost" information as the basis for new inven-
tions).
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tinued use."'32  But in some circumstances, that may be exactly
what businesses are supposed to do. If a technology that the holder
refuses to license is valuable enough and necessary enough to
competition, competitors should be allowed to pay for it, either
through royalties or civil penalties, and then enjoy the right to use
it freely.
This is not to say that every taking of a trade secret is appropri-
ate. Some valuable information products are not patentable or
copyrightable. Trade secrecy law is an important adjunct to the
federal system precisely because it provides a way to encourage
their development. As the technologies of appropriation become
more effective, it is not unreasonable to "beef up" trade secrecy
law to meet new threats. Courts that apply the new law must,
however, be aware that there are important public interests that lie
on the side of keeping the "beef' within bounds. The rhetoric ac-
companying the EEA obscured the interest in these limits. Courts
must not only make sure that the EEA does not wind up protecting
public information, but they must also be sensitive to interpreta-
tions that will chill activity that should be lawful.'33
The clearest problem is the effect that the statute could have on
employment. The EEA was quite definitely targeted at employees.
The legislative history is replete with references to such matters as
theft by "disgruntled individuals or employees who hope to harm
their former company,"' 3 4 to "theft by insiders,"'35 to "the former
132. S. REP. No. 104-359, at 11 (1996).
133. Cf. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). The Supreme Court stated
that:
[T]he policies served by the Copyright Act are more complex, more measured,
than simply maximizing the number of meritorious suits for copyright in-
fringement. The Constitution grants to Congress the power "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies.".. . We have often recognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has
authorized, while 'intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and in-
ventors by the provision of a special reward,' are limited in nature and must ul-
timately serve the public good.
Id. at 526 (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
429 (1984)) (internal citation omitted).
134. S. REP. No. 104-359, at 18 (1996); H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 5 (1996), re-
printed in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4023.
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employee of two major computer companies,"'36 and to "employees
who leave their employment and use their knowledge about spe-
cific products or processes in order to duplicate them or develop
similar goods for themselves or a new employer in order to com-
pete with their prior employer."'3 7 The structure of the statute is
consistent with this purpose. It covers all the common methods of
transferring information from one employer to another, including
memorization and possibly even inevitable disclosure. The statute
clearly includes positive technologies and also admits of an inter-
pretation that encompasses negative know-how. It applies not only
to individuals, but also to organizations. The penalties can be very
high.
The result is that, unless the statute quickly receives a narrow-
ing interpretation, the high-tech labor market will be rigidified.
Although the legislative history makes clear that the EEA is not
intended to cover use of "lawfully developed knowledge, skill, or
abilities, ' neither the legislative history nor the Act provides a
way to decide what is proprietary knowledge and what is merely a
skill. Employees will, therefore, be vulnerable whenever they ac-
cept positions that utilize expertise developed with a prior em-
ployer. By the same token, a company that needs a particular set
of capabilities will be at risk if it hires anyone other than an entry-
level candidate. Or, if a firm does hire someone proficient in par-
ticular technologies, it will be forced to employ that person outside
her area of expertise or build a wall between that person and others
at the firm who could utilize what she knows. 13 9
None of this can be good for innovation. As intellectual prod-
ucts become more complex, it has become increasingly difficult for
firms to cultivate in-house all of the expertise necessary to develop
135. S. REP. No. 104-359, at 8 (1996).
136. Id.
137. H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 7 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021,
4026.
138. S. REP. No. 104-359, at 12 (1996); H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 18-19 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4026 ("The statute is not intended to be used to
prosecute employees who change employers or start their own companies using general
knowledge and skills developed while employed.").
139. See Mossinghoff et al., supra note 13, at 201, 205-6; Pooley et al., supra note
42, at 222.
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new technologies. Accordingly, outside consultants and new hires
are necessary if innovation is to take place efficiently and expedi-
tiously.4 1 Conversely, if technologies are to cross-over from the
field where they were developed to all of the places where they can
be used, new employees will need to be exposed to the knowledge
base of their new firms. Failing to hire, or building walls around
new hires, slows the flow of ideas and ultimately hinders develop-
ment. Ironically, this is actually a problem that Congress once
recognized and acted swiftly to counteract. Thus, after a series of
decisions where federal courts invalidated patents on the basis of
prior research within the firm in which the invention was made,
Congress amended the Patent Act to change "a complex body of
case law which discourages communications among members of
research teams working in corporations.'' It is a pity that Con-
gress seems to have forgotten the importance of information flows
in connection with the EEA.
The cost to employees will, of course, also be high. If employ-
ers are unwilling to risk prosecution under the EEA, employees
may find themselves suboptimally employed. This will effect
compensation. First, money is only one form of compensation in
this sector: learning new skills and developing new areas of exper-
tise is another. If these skills become nontransferable, the em-
ployment bargain will be undermined. 42 Second, in white collar
circles, salary increases are often procured by changing jobs or
making credible threats to change. By making these threats less
credible, the EEA may hold down wages. And although American
business might initially appreciate lower salaries, depressing com-
pensation in the technological sector will be harmful in the long
run. It could lead to fewer people entering these fields, which
140. Cf. Walter W. Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration in the Biotechnol-
ogy Industry, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 197 (1996) (discussing the
problem of assessing the potential of new technologies).
141. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 Section-by-Section Analysis, Pub. L.
No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3392, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5831 (1998) (amending
35 U.S.C. § 103).
142. There is also a tinge of possible racism in the discussion of espionage for the
benefit of government entities that could translate into job discrimination against ethnics
of countries that are suspected of economic espionage. Cf Tucker, supra note 56, at
1123 (mentioning Japanese and Israelis as possible perpetrators).
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would lead to a reduction in the talent available to draw upon.
The EEA could also have a chilling effect on corporate re-
structuring. Every high-tech employee who starts his own firm, or
gets spun off into a new division, will risk prosecution. Yet, as One
commentator noted, a place like Silicon Valley "has depended [on
this form of employee mobility] for much of its vitality.' ' 143 Fur-
thermore, partly because the Act incorporates licensors as potential
victims, the EEA could also affect mergers and acquisitions, for
these create situations where employees hired by one entity work
for another, or technology licensed to one entity is exploited by
another. The corporate literature has made the benefits of corpo-
rate flexibility abundantly clear. All that needs to be added here is
to highlight the special benefits that restructuring can bring to the
technology sector, where it is sometimes important to segregate
risks of nondevelopment or tort liability, and where a lean-and-
mean management style can be an important ingredient in product
development.
Finally, there is the matter of joint ventures. In the technology
sectors, these are -important for at least two reasons. First, tech-
nologies are often developed in steps-a pioneer invention is made
by A, an improvement is made by B, and others may come along
later to make further improvements and apply the insight to new
fields. Allocating the profits on the products that end-users ulti-
mately enjoy may not be an easy matter: if A receives all of the
benefit, there is little incentive to follow on; if B receives all of the
benefit, then there will be insufficient encouragement to pioneers.
These allocation problems can be partly solved though joint ven-
tures and other methods of pooling rights.'44
Second, joint ventures are also helpful to the development of
complex technologies that require the efforts of researchers with
many different areas of expertise. Although sometimes diverse ca-
143. Dan Goodin, New Trade Secret Laws Will Cast A Wider Net, RECORDER, Dec.
23, 1996, at 1.
144. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Re-
search and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 35-37 (1991). Cf. Robert P. Merges,
Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Or-
ganizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (arguing that proposals to create more compul-
sory licenses are based upon a faulty theoretical framework).
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pabilities are united through employment, it can sometimes be the
case that no employer wants to risk the cost of hiring everyone
whose knowledge is required. In such situations, the various ex-
pertises needed may come together through more informal net-
works. 45 The plan in both versions of joint venturing is to share in
the profits flowing from the intellectual property rights. It may not
be easy, however, to predict ex ante what technologies will be in-
vented, or how they will be protected. In some cases, the under-
standing of participants is rather unclear and it is not unlikely that
some method of dispute resolution will be necessary to iron things
out at the end. But while the parties may feel that the benefits of
developing the technology are worth the risk of civil litigation,
they may not feel the same way about criminal prosecution. Thus,
we may see fewer of these collaborations as the Act becomes bet-
ter known. If learning new things puts people at risk of becoming
unemployable in the sector for which they have trained, the taste
for joining research conglomerations could diminish as well.
There is an interesting footnote to this statute. Apparently, not
everyone in the government is certain that American business will
be best served by improving the capacity to hide existing technol-
ogy. In a letter to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chair of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, Attorney General Janet Reno indicated that for the
first five years after enactment, EEA prosecution will require her
personal approval or that of her deputy attorney general, or assis-
tant attorney general for the criminal division. 146A great deal of se-
lectivity in EEA prosecutions is, of course, one way to make sure
that the statute does not overreach. However, it is a limited pre-
caution. Most of the situations that would be criminal under the
EEA could have been prosecuted under more general federal stat-
utes. 47 Thus, passage of the EEA cannot but serve as a powerful
directive to prosecutors to allocate more of their resources to this
area. The courts hearing these cases will, therefore, have to be ag-
gressive in interpreting ambiguous language to make sure that a
145. See Powell, supra note 140, at 197; Rebecca Eisenberg, Intellectual Property
at the Public-Private Divide: The Case of Large Scale CDNA Sequencing, 3 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 557 (1996).
146. See Savage, supra note 86, at 16.
147. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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statute designed to protect "the health and competitiveness of criti-
cal industries" does not get translated into a provision that under-
mines their vitality.'
48
And while we can hope that the Attorney General and her
deputies will make considered judgments on when to use the EEA,
the fact of the matter is that the EEA is not the only legislative de-
velopment with similar problems. For example, a recent amend-
ment to the Copyright Act criminalizes the downloading of com-
mercially valuable information. 49 Another new Act criminalizes
tampering with encryption devices.5 ° Given the amount of mate-
rial now stored in computers, the confluence of these three meas-
ures could put much of what is vital to innovation beyond the reach
of most innovators.
CONCLUSION
The baseline, the Supreme Court has said, is competition. De-
partures from free competition are "carefully crafted bargain[s].'''
The public foregoes the benefits that flow from competition in or-
der to induce creative endeavors and to assure their adequate dis-
closure to the public domain. In recent years, our legislators have
lost sight of that bargain. After watching steep declines in the
manufacturing sector, lawmakers are apparently so relieved that
the United States still has something that the rest of the world
wants, they have rushed to make sure that those who want what we
have are, indeed, forced to purchase it. What they have neglected
to notice is that the "something" is not the specific technologies
that we have on hand today, but novelty. Novelty does not last
long. To be positioned to replace what is novel now with what will
be novel in the future, we need to protect the dynamic process that
produces innovation. That process requires a robust public domain
148. Statement by President William J. Clinton's Statement upon signing H.R.
3723, Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2040 (Oct. 11,
1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4034.
149. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 506 (West Supp. 1999).
150. See Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The Act creates civil and criminal prohibi-
tions against the use, manufacture, or sale of devices that are primarily designed or pro-
duced for the purpose of circumventing copyright protection systems.
151. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151, 156 (1989).
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from which innovators can draw, an atmosphere where collabora-
tion can occur, and a climate in which ideas can diffuse rapidly.
The high levels of deterrence imposed by criminal law are
largely incompatible with these conditions. The EEA's mongrel
nature, which makes it difficult to find sources of interpretation
and limitation, exacerbates the problem. It can be interpreted to
nudge the line between what is private and what is public toward
the private side. It fences in certain information that belongs in the
public domain and chills sharing. It will almost certainly slow in-
formation flows in the employment context.
On the state and civil front, there is also the interaction of the
EEA and proposed Article 2B to worry about. Again, there can be
no quarrel about the need to create a mechanism that allows the
producers of sub-copyrightable and sub-patentable material to earn
a return on their investment. But the combination of these initia-
tives could alter the basic bargain in unintended ways. First, Arti-
cle 2B opens the class of material that is protectable. Among other
things, it changes the definition of what is public; it may be inter-
preted to make protectable any information that is subject to a duty
of confidentiality, irrespective of whether the information is public
or private. Will the EEA be read to criminalize the acquisition of
information that is valuable because it is considered secret under
Article 2B? How about the use of public information on which a
promise of confidentiality has been extracted? Second, Article 2B
permits licensors to ask licensees to refrain from particular uses,
including uses that might be considered fair under copyright law
Will such restrictions turn the information at issue into trade se-
crets within the meaning of the EEA? Will ignoring such a re-
striction be a crime? There is a version of Article 2B that envi-
sions enforcing these restrictions with monitoring devices: will
circumventing the monitor violate the EEA? Will it violate the
new anti-tampering legislation? Third, Article 2B is very efficient
at passing restrictions down the line from developers, to licensees,
to end-users. Will the owner/licensor language in the EEA make
subsequent purchasers vulnerable to criminal prosecution? How
will the "attempts" language of the EEA affect these questions?
The EEA could be interpreted narrowly and become a useful
adjunct to other intellectual property legislation. But it has a po-
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tentially broad scope. Unless carefully construed, it will allow
people to hide secrets in ways that will make it impossible for oth-
ers to hear, or learn, or know. It could, in the end, breach the care-
ful bargain that intellectual property law has crafted-to the ulti-
mate detriment of the economic sectors that Congress sought to
foster.
